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GUNS AND INTIMATE VIOLENCE:* A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE
LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT**
The Lautenberg Amendment, 1("the Amendment") an amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968,2 makes it illegal for any
person "convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" to ship, receive or possess firearms or ammunition
affecting interstate commerce. 3 Unlike other firearm regulations, this Amendment has been applied to law enforcement officers and military personnel. 4 Congress intended the Amendment
to protect victims of domestic violence from further harm by removing guns from the hands of individuals who have demonstrated a propensity toward violence against an intimate partner. 5 Although domestic violence has always existed in our
society, its magnitude as a serious public health problem has
been increasingly recognized in recent years. 6 The breadth of the
* The author would like to thank her family for their constant love and support, without which this Note would not be possible. The author would also like to express her
gratitude to Maia Brody Field for her inspiration, assistance and thoughtfulness during
this process.
** At the time of the publication of this Note there were no other challenges to the
Lautenberg Amendment, however, there were cases pending in the United States Court of
Appeals addressing the issues raised in this Note.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1999).
2 Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, §5801, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
3 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
4 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)(1).
5 See Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearingson S 2646 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Cong. 2646, 2 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg, sponsor of the Amendment) (stating that purpose of § 922(g)(9) was to protect
victims of domestic violence from further harm); Guns and Domestic Violence Change to
Ownership Ban: Hearings on S 2646, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Congress
10379, 1-2 (1996) (statement of Mrs. Murray) (providing statistics to endorse removing
guns from homes of domestic violence offenders); id. at 3-5 (statement of Sen. Diane Feinstein) (referring to necessity of legislation at misdemeanor level due to factors that many
domestic violence offenders are never convicted of felonies, victims are reluctant to cooperate for fear of more violence and plea bargains result in misdemeanor conviction for
what are felony crimes).
6 See Susan Wilt & Sarah Olson, Prevalenceof Domestic Violence in the United States,
51 JAMWA 77, 77 (May/July 1996) (discussing domestic violence as serious public health
problem that has increased in recent years).
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problem spans both racial and socioeconomic boundaries. 7 Today, domestic violence seems to have reached epidemic proportions.8 The Lautenberg Amendment is a much needed response 9
which "may help reduce the lethality of violence against women"
by requiring known domestic violence misdemeanants to relinquish firearms in their possession. 10
Law enforcement officials and members of the military have
questioned the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment
on several levels. 11 Initially, they assert that the new federal law
violates the Equal Protection Clause on three grounds: (1) it unfairly applies to domestic violence misdemeanants as opposed to
other misdemeanor crimes; (2) it applies only to domestic violence misdemeanors and not to felonies; and (3) it singles out law
enforcement officials, specifically, as a particular class of individuals. 12 Secondly, they suggest that the Amendment exceeds
7 See id. at 81 (finding domestic violence more common among couples of lower socioeconomic status, but no significant differences among racial and ethnic groups).
8 See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 46 (1992) (recognizing half of all married women will be
beaten by their husbands at least once and U.S. Surgeon General found battering by husbands, ex-husbands or lovers accounts for one-fifth of all hospital emergency room visits
for women and is single largest cause of injury to women in United States). See generally
Nikki R. Van Hightower & Susan A. McManus, Limits of State Constitutional Guarantees:
Lessons from Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence Policies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 269
(1989) (setting forth statistics indicating instances of domestic violence are reaching epidemic proportions).
9 See NANCY A. CROWELL & ANN W. BURGESS, UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 26 (Nat'l Academy Press 1996). Incidents of domestic violence constitute the largest group of calls received by police every year. Id. Women are most likely to be murdered
with a firearm: 75 percent of all homicides in the United States in 1997 were committed
with a firearm. Id. The risk of homicide in the home by a family member or intimate
partner for both women and men is seven and eight times higher if a gun is kept in the
home. Id.
1o See e.g., Why Give Wife Beaters Guns?, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A24 (stating
that purpose of bill is to prevent domestic abusers from using guns to injure spouses).
n, See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1997),
rev'd, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (challenging constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) by union
of law enforcement officials), National Ass'n. of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp.
1564, 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1997), affd, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998) (claiming unconstitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment by law enforcement officials agency); see also Guns
and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Bar Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 105th
Cong. (1997) (testimony of Kenneth Lyons, National President International Brotherhood
of Police Officers), available in, 1997 WL 101020 (F.D.C.H.) (challenging unconstitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment); id. (claiming Lautenberg Law violates Ex-Post Facto
Clause of Constitution). See generally Bobb Barr, Barr's Bill Stops Retroactive Use of Domestic Violence Law, Congressional Press Release, Jan. 8, 1997 (stating Lautenberg
Amendment is unconstitutional because it applies retroactively).
12 See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp.2d 811, 822-23 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (alleging Lautenberg Amendment violates Equal Protection Clause); FraternalOrder of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4-5 (challenging constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) on equal protection
grounds); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1572-73 (claiming Lauten-
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Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. 13 Thirdly, the
Amendment is criticized as being retroactive and thus violative of
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 14 Finally, the Amendment is said to
constitute a bill of attainder by virtue of its ability to inflict pun15
ishment.
The constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment has been
upheld in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
and in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, Fulton
County. 16 Other district courts, similarly to the Eleventh Circuit,
have upheld the Amendment's constitutionality. 1 7 However, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court's ruling that the Lautenberg Amendment was constitutional in The FraternalOrder of Police v. United States of America.18
This Note demonstrates why the Lautenberg Amendment is
necessary legislation and will probably be amended to include
domestic violence felons in order to withstand further constitutional challenges. It compares the community notification and
registration laws (Megan's Laws) 19 which are challenged on
berg Amendment violates Equal Protection Clause).
13 See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 821-22 (contending Lautenberg Amendment is unconstitutional under Commerce Clause); Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4
(challenging constitutionality of § 922(g)(9) under Commerce Clause); National Ass'n of
Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1572 (claiming Lautenberg Amendment violates Commerce Clause).
14 See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825-26 (alleging Lautenberg Amendment violates Ex
Post Facto Clause); see also National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1575-76
(challenging constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment under Ex Post Facto Clause);
United States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 67 (D. Mass. 1997) (asserting §922(g)(9) increases punishment for defendant's prior misdemeanor conviction, thus violating Ex Post
Facto Clause); United States v. Hicks, 992 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (D. Kan. 1997) (claiming
the Lautenberg Amendment violates Ex Post Facto Clause).
15 See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825-26 (asserting § 922(g)(9) violates the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at
1576-77 (challenging constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment under Bill of Attainder
Clause).
16 968 F. Supp. at 1569 (contesting constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment).
17 See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 829 (upholding constitutionality of Lautenberg
Amendment on all grounds); Meade, 986 F. Supp. at 69 (stating Lautenberg Amendment
does not violate Ex Post Facto Clause); Hicks, 992 F. Supp. at 1246 (holding Lautenberg
Amendment constitutional under Ex Post Facto Clause).
is See Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 2 (disputing constitutionality of
§922(g)(9)).
is See Artway v. Attorney Gen. N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1996). On October
31, 1994, New Jersey was the first state to enact a "Megan's Law". Id. The Law requires
"repetitive and compulsive" sex offenders to register with the local law enforcement
agency. Id. The law came about when seven year-old Megan Kanka was raped and mur-
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similar grounds, with the exception of the Commerce Clause
challenge. 20 Both attempt to correct social evils (domestic violence and child abuse) and necessarily restrict certain individual
rights in order to achieve their respective legislative goals. 2 1 By
applying the constitutional analysis used in scrutinizing Megan's
Laws, the Lautenberg Amendment will also withstand constitutional challenge.
Part I of this Note, provides a discussion of the Lautenberg
Amendment's legislative aims. Part II explores the constitutionality of the Amendment, with respect to the Equal Protection,
Commerce and Ex Post Facto Clauses. Finally, Part III of this
Note concludes that the Lautenberg Amendment is necessary
legislation that may need to be amended to include felons convicted of domestic violence in order to withstand further constitutional challenges.
I. THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT - A GENERAL OVERVIEW
In September

1996, Congress enacted what is commonly

dered by her neighbor who was convicted twice of sexual assault. Id. Along with the registration provisions of Megan's Law, there exists a three-tier notification procedure. Id.; see
also New Jersey's Sexual Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. 1994, Chs. 128, 133 ( N.J.S.A.
2C: 7-1 to 7-11). All "repetitive and compulsive" sexual offenders after serving their sentence, are required to register with their local law enforcement agency. N.J.S.A. 2C: 7-1 to
7-11. They must provide their name, current legal address of residence, social security
number, height, weight, date of birth, hair color, sex, age, and date and place of employment. N.J.S.A. 2C: 7-4b(1). They must confirm their address every ninety days, notify the
law enforcement agency if they move, and re-register with the new local law enforcement
agency. N.J.S.A_ 2C: 7-2d - e. See generally Artway, 81 F.3d at 1243. Failure to comply
with these registration requirements is a fourth degree crime. Id.
There are also notification provisions to Megan's Law. Id. at 1243-44. The prosecutor of
the county in which the registrant live determines whether the registrant is a low, medium or high risk reoffender and places them in tiers one, two, or three (tier three is the
highest risk offender category). Id. at 1244. Under the lowest tier, (tier one) the county
prosecutor notifies any law enforcement agency that may come into contact with the registrant. Id. Under tier two, schools, day care facilities, and any organization related to
child care or abused women are notified. Id. The highest tier notifies members of the
public, who may come into contact with the sex offender, with the registrants personal
information given. Id. See, e.g., M.C.L. §28.721 et seq.; Mass. G.L. c. 6, 178C-1780. Similar "Megan's Laws" have been adopted in many states across the nation. Id.
2o See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1246-47 (setting forth similar constitutional arguments as
cases challenging Lautenberg Amendment); Abraham Abramovsky, Megan's Law: Is it
Constitutional?And is it Moral?, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1995, at 3 (stating that Artway validated Tier one provisions of Megan's law but not Tier three or Tier two provisions); Justice Kahn, People v. Patrick Griffen, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 22, 1996, at A29, (citing cases in which
courts held that community notification laws do not violate Ex Post Facto Clause).
21 See generally Artway, 81 F.3d at 1247 (providing statute attempts to protect society
from repeat sexual offenders); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp.
1564, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (setting forth Lautenberg Amendment to protect families from
further intimate abuse).
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known as the Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of
1968.22

The Lautenberg Amendment, proposed by Senator

Frank Lautenberg, makes it unlawful for "any person.., who
23
has been convicted of a misdemeanor of domestic violence" to
ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms in or affecting commerce. 24 Congress enacted this legislation to protect women
from domestic violence by keeping firearms out of the hands of
individuals who are prone to violence in an attempt to reduce the
risk of fatal injury. 25
In the past two decades, law enforcement officials in domestic
violence situations have moved away from non-arrest, nonintervention and avoidance policies due to increased awareness
and repugnance for intimate violence. 26 Accordingly, legislative
actions have encouraged the implementation of "mandatory arrest or pro-arrest policies, improve[d] tracking of cases involving
domestic violence, centralize[d] and coordinated police enforcement, prosecution, and judicial responsibility for domestic violence cases." 27 All of these efforts reflect a shift in philosophy
22 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (1997).
23 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) (1997). A "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" is de-

fined in The Act as any misdemeanor that has as an element the use or attempted use of
physical force or the threatened use of a deadly weapon committed by the victim's current
or former domestic partner, parent, or guardian. Id.
24 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (1997).
25 See Lautenberg, supra note 5 (stating that purpose of § 922(g)(9) was to protect victims of domestic violence from further harm by removing firearms from known offenders);
see also Guns and Domestic Violence Changes to Ownership Ban: Hearings on S 2646, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Cong. (1997) (testimony of William Johnson, General
Counsel, National Association of Police Organization Inc.) (agreeing with goal of Amendment, which is taking firearms out of households that have history of domestic violence,
but disagreeing with method of Amendment); Guns and Domestic Violence Changes to
Ownership Ban: Hearings on S 2646, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Cong. (1997)
(statement of Rep. William McCollum) (noting his agreement with plans that prevent
those convicted of violent crimes from
possessing firearms). But see Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban:
Hearings on S 2646, Before the House Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Cong. 5 (1997) (testimony of Bernard H. Tedorski, National Vice President of Fraternal Order of Police) (arguing that Lautenberg Amendment will not serve its stated purpose of preventing domestic violence fatalities).
26 See Domestic Violence: Violence Between Intimates, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SELECTED FINDINGS, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nov. 1994, at 5 (citing statistics demonstrating
shift from non-intervention to pro-arrest policies in domestic violence cases).
27 See William G. Bassler, The Federalizationof Domestic Violence An Exercise in Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1139, 1145 (1996). The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ('vAWA") was enacted
as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Id. at 1141.
VAWA establishes a National Commission of Violent Crime against Women to promote a
national policy to combat and reduce such crimes, and make federal grants available for
law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to develop state and local strategies. Id. at
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aimed at holding the perpetrator, not the victim, accountable for
the violence. 2 8 The Lautenberg Amendment reflects a substan29
tial step in prioritizing the rights of victims.
The Lautenberg Amendment is different from other gun control laws because it applies to misdemeanants rather than felons 3 0 and it does not exclude law enforcement officials or military
personnel. 3 1 Due to this departure from prior federal gun control
laws, the Lautenberg Amendment has been subjected to criticisms by the media, members of Congress and law enforcement
1146; Keirsten L. Walsh, Safe and Sound at Last? Federalized Anti-Stalking Legislation
in the United States and Canada, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 373, 374 (1996). VAWA provides
over one and one-half billion dollars to combat gender-based violence as a violation of a
woman's civil rights simultaneously attempting to categorize these crimes on the same
level as crimes motivated by religious or racial biases. Id.
An analysis of state and federal laws, recognizing instances of violence towards women,
can be described as "the leftover bones thrown to a starving dog." Id. Although focusing on
anti-stalking legislation in particular, similar descriptions can be made of past laws related to domestic violence. Id. Such laws usually come after a highly publicized case of
abuse towards women, such as the O.J. Simpson case. Id.; see also Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic & State Univ., 132 F. 3d 949, 974 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit held
that VAWA did not exceed the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause.
Id.; Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608, 615-17 (D. Conn. 1996). The district court in Connecticut upheld the constitutionality of VAWA under the Commerce Clause. Id. The court
stated that the purpose of VAWA is to improve the criminal and civil justice systems'
handling of matters of domestic violence and violence against women. Id.
2 See generally National Committee for Injury Prevention and Control, Injury Prevention: Meeting the Challenge, 5 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 223

(Supp. Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (indicating recent shifts in philosophy towards holding
perpetrator not victim responsible).
29 See generally Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure:Punishment Theory and
the Criminal - Civil ProceduralDivide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 799 (1997) (discussing role in
advancing victim's rights).
3o See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (1997) (applying to individuals convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors); see also Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 2
(D.D.C. 1997), rev'd, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating § 922(g)(9) applies to any person convicted of misdemeanor crime of domestic violence); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1997), affid, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th
Cir. 1998) (noting Lautenberg Amendment applies to domestic violence misdemeanants).
See generally 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) (stating § 922(g)(1) provides that it "shall be unlawful
for any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" from possession of firearms); FraternalOrder of Police, 152 F.3d at 1003 (noting states are not consistent in their application of these statutes, some require predicate felony offenses in order to trigger the statute and New York
has public interest exception, exempting New York military, police officers and peace officers). It is submitted that perhaps the legislature does not include domestic violence felons as part of the Lautenberg Amendment due to the fact that most states have statutes
pertaining to the removal of firearms from felons. See e.g., Cal. Penal Code §12021(a)(1)
(West 1997) (indicating felon's possession of firearm is felony); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1
(1997) (stating firearm possession by felon is also felony).
31 See Jonathan Kerr, Critics Say Anti-Domestic Violence Amendment Takes Shot at
Police, available in, 1996 WL 684742 (stating that for first time in history of United
States gun control legislation, there is no longer exemption for police, military personnel
and government officials).
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groups across the country. 32 Recently, bills that provide exemptions for law enforcement officials and military personnel have
been introduced in Congress. 3 3 Many of these groups seek to rescind the Lautenberg Amendment entirely alleging it is unconstitutional. 34
A. Proposed Exemptions for Law Enforcement Officers and
Military Officials
The Amendment, in its application to law enforcement officials,
has forced many police officers to turn in their weapons. 3 5 In
32 See New Domestic Violence Gun Law Includes Cops, NEWSDAY, Dec. 19, 1996, at 9
(rejecting applicants to Police Departments with records of domestic discord due to new
federal gun law); see also John C. Ensslin, More Denver Officers Will Have to Surrender
Their Guns: New Interpretationof Law Adds Violation of City Ordinances to List That

Precludes Ownership, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 29, 1997 at 3 (indicating as new fed-

eral gun control law is interpreted more police officers will have to turn in their weapons);
R. Joseph Gelarden, New Federal Weapons Law Puts Police Under the Gun, Officers Convicted of Domestic Abuse May Lose Jobs Because They Can't Carry Their Weapons, THE
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 6, 1996 at Al (asserting hundreds of police officers nationally
will be affected by new domestic violence law); Susan Sward, New Gun Law Could Disarm Police Officers - Weapons Banned for Cops Guilty of Misdemeanor Family Violence,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 1997, at Al (noting nation's law enforcement agencies scrambling to
see how many officers may have to lay down weapons); Hector Tobar, 3 Deputies Go to
Court, Regain Right to Carry Guns: Law, Domestic Violence Convictions Expunged, They
No Longer Fall Under FederalFirearms Control Statute, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1997 at B1
(examining situation where sheriffs deputies who lost rights to carry firearms had their
misdemeanor convictions expunged).
33 See H.R. 1009, 105th Cong. (1997). This is a bill to repeal the Lautenberg Amendment. Id. The rationale behind this bill is that the Amendment is unconstitutional because a nexus between domestic violence and interstate commerce has not been established, essentially violating states' rights. Id. The bill also states that the Amendment
violates the Tenth Amendment as well as the Commerce Clause. Id. Also, supporters of
the bill contend that the Amendment imposes a penalty on crimes committed before its
enactment, and thus is violative of due process and constitutes an ex post facto law. Id.
34 See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp.2d 811, 814 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (contesting constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment); United States v. Hicks, 992 F. Supp.
1244, 1245 (D. Kan. 1997) (claiming §922(g)(9) violates Ex Post Facto Clause); United
States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 67 (D. Mass. 1997) (challenging unconstitutionality of
Lautenberg Amendment); see also United States v. Fraternal Order of Police, 981 F.
Supp. 1, 2 (D.C.C. 1997) (asserting unconstitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment), rev'd,
152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp.
1564, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (examining constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment),
affd, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998).

3s See, e.g., NEWSDAY, supra note 32, at 9. In attempting to comply with the new law,
police departments are beginning to reject applicants based on their domestic violence
misdemeanor status where previously they only screened for felonies. Id. According to police, a misdemeanor domestic violence conviction is now considered an automatic disqualifier for applicants. Id. Also, the law now precludes misdemeanor offenders from the ability
to possess a firearm thus preventing them from satisfying one of the essential criteria of
the position of police officers. Id. Approximately ten percent of the 700,000 law enforcement officers in America will have their firearms revoked if the Lautenberg Amendment
is adhered to. Id.
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many cases, a police officer or member of the military will be unemployed if they are stripped of their weapons. 3 6 Exemptions
have been proposed to eliminate the application of the Lautenberg Amendment towards law enforcement officials and military
personnel. 3 7 It is important to examine the policies and goals the
new law attempts to achieve when addressing these proposed ex38
emptions.
Normally a woman's primary source of help from abuse by an
intimate partner is the law enforcement community. 3 9 For this
reason, police officers should be strictly held to this law. A police
officer who is a domestic abuser may not have the requisite objectivity to respond to an intimate abuse situation. 4 0 If a police officer who has also been convicted of domestic violence is called into
this type of situation, with whom will he side? 4 1 Will someone
capable of domestic violence and with a documented history of intimate violence possess the requisite neutrality to protect other
women from their abusers?4 2 Furthermore, since police officers
carry firearms while off-duty and bring their guns into their
homes, this law should be particularly emphasized in its application to them. 4 3 It does not seem logical that the drafters of the
law could have intended such an exemption for police officers.
a See Gelarden, supra note 32 at Al (discussing effect of new federal gun control law
may render law enforcement officials unemployed); Sward, supra note 32 at Al (examining repercussions of new domestic violence law to police officers).
37 See, e.g., H.R. 1009, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing to exempt military and law enforcement officials from application of Lautenberg Amendment).
3s
See, James Bovard, Disarming Those Who Need Guns Most, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23,
1996, at A12. Frank Lautenberg discussed his deep-seeded feeling behind the Amendment
that "if you beat your wife.., you should not have a gun." Id. The presumption behind
the Lautenberg law is that men must be disarmed in order to reduce an epidemic of wife
killing. Id.; see also Walsh, supra note 27, at 1Ai Press Secretary for Senator Lautenberg,
stated that this legislation was introduced to save lives. Id.
39 See generally National Committee for Injury Prevention and Control, Injury Prevention: Meeting the Challenge, 5 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 229 (Oxford University Press
1989) (demonstrating law enforcement officials as primary resource for abused women).
40 See Scott Glover, Domestic Violence Arrests Within LAPD Rise: Sharp Increase has
been Seen Since Special Unit Formed in Response to Report Citing Leniency. Six Officers
have been Jailed this Year., L.A. TIMES, February 20, 1998, at B1 (citing instances of arrests of law enforcement officers for domestic violence offenses).
41 See id. (indicating possible bias in police officers with prior domestic violence convictions).
42 See id. (suggesting possibility of lack of neutrality in domestic violence situations
when involving law enforcement official with past convictions of domestic violence).
43 See Domestic Abuse Records of Officers Checked, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1997, at B4
(noting due to fact that police carry firearms into homes, one way in which police are being held to Lautenberg Amendment, is departmental background checks of their abusive
history).
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Excluding police officers would weaken the law's ultimate goals
of protecting women and children from the risk of fatal injury by
intimates known to be prone to violence. 4 4
Although this law has not yet been implemented with respect
to the military, the Pentagon is taking steps to interpret its effects as application begins towards military personnel. 4 5 The
Lautenberg Amendment makes it a felony for any person who
has been convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor to receive
or possess firearms and ammunition which have moved in interstate commerce. 4 6 It is also a felony to sell or transfer firearms
and ammunition to such persons. 4 7 Thus, both the company
commander and soldier may have committed a felony when that
soldier draws a weapon from the arms room. 48
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT
The constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment has been
challenged on Equal Protection grounds because it applies to specific members of a particular class or group of individuals. 4 9 The
4

See Gary Fields, Domestic Abuse Gun Law is Disarming Cops, USA TODAY, March

5, 1997, at 10A (indicating spouses of law enforcement officials are reluctant to get help

for abuse out of fear that co-worker will protect fellow officer).
45 See Dick Foster, Gun Law Puts Military in Spin; New Rule on Domestic Violence
Has UncertainImpact, Leaving Brass Feeling a Bit Disarmed, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
Dec. 4, 1996, at 16A. This Amendment has the potential to jeopardize the careers among
members of the armed forces where having the ability to carry firearms is a prerequisite
to service. Id. Pentagon officials have struggled with the fact that this law would disqualify perhaps hundreds of its 1.5 million troops from serving if they could no longer carry

their weapons. Id. Many problems and questions arise in regards to applying the law to
the military. Id. Definitions of "firearms" will have to be made: will an F-16 fighter plane
or a nuclear submarine constitute a firearm for purposes of the Lautenberg Amendment.
Id. Also, it is necessary in some areas of the armed forces that soldiers qualify with a
weapon in order to serve in the military. Id. Will this prevent some individuals from
qualifying and perhaps rendering them non-deployable since they cannot possess firearms? Id.; see also Gail Gibson, Will New Law Take Guns Out of Some Soldiers' Hands?,
THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE AND DAILY MAIL, August 6, 1997, at 3A. Activists are frustrated that the military, to date, has not been able to implement the law as it has not received any direction from the Pentagon. Id. The new law has "fired a volley of confusion
into the nation's armed forces, where possessing and using weapons is a profession." Id.
46 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Supp. 1999).
47 See id. § 922(d).
4s See Major Einwechter & Captain Christiansen, Abuse Your Spouse and Lose Your
Job: Federal Law Now ProhibitsSome Soldiers From Possessing Military Weapons, 1997
ARMY LAW. 25, 25 (1997) (analyzing new law with respect to military and setting forth

potential guidelines to implement Lautenberg Amendment).
49 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1997)
(claiming unconstitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment under Equal Protection Clause),
rev'd, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998); National Ass'n of Govt Employees v. Barrett, 968 F.
Supp. 1564, 1572-73 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (discussing Equal Protection claims), aff'd, 155 F.3d
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Amendment has also been criticized as exceeding Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. 50 Finally, it has been opposed
for being unconstitutionally retroactive under the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 5 1 In examining the tests and analysis to be used in de-

termining the legitimacy of the Lautenberg Amendment, an in
depth discussion of two cases challenging its constitutionality is
necessary.
In National Association of Government Employees, Inc. v. Barrett, Fulton County and United States of America,52 the plaintiff,
("NAGE"), an employee association and "union representative for
non-supervisory peace officers," brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the Lautenberg Amendment. 53 NAGE imputed
the unconstitutionality of the Amendment under the Commerce, 54 Equal Protection, 55 Due Process, 56 Ex Post Facto57 and
1276 (1lth Cir. 1998).
so See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1572. The court distinguishes this case from United States v. Lopez, because the Lautenberg Amendment, unlike the statute in Lopez, contains a jurisdictional element that requires the government
to demonstrate that the firearm was possessed "in or affecting commerce" or has been received after having "been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Id.;
see also Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp. 2d 811, 821-22 (S.D. Ind. 1998). The
plaintiff again compared the Lautenberg Amendment to the statute in Lopez alleging that
its jurisdictional nexus was insufficient. Id.
51 See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 825-26 (contending that Lautenberg Amendment
does not create retroactive criminal penalties); NationalAss'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F.
Supp. at 1575-76 (indicating Lautenberg Amendment is constitutional under Ex Post
Facto Clause); United States v. Hicks, 992 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (D. Kan. 1997) (recognizing Lautenberg Amendment as constitutional under Ex Post Facto Clause); United States
v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass. 1997) (examining Ex Post Facto claims).
52 968 F. Supp. 1564.

s3 See id. at 1572. The plaintiff is challenging the constitutionality of the Lautenberg
Amendment. Id. Plaintiff, William S. Hiley, was a deputy sheriff employed by defendant
Fulton County. Id. at 1568. He was issued a firearm which was a requirement to the performance of his employment. Id. In August, 1995 he "ple[d] 'no contest' to a misdemeanor
battery that involved a domestic violence charge and was sentenced to a 12-month term of
non-reporting probation." Id.. When Hiley reported his conviction to the Sheriffs Department, he was not disciplined. Id. However, after the passage of the Lautenberg Amendment, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms issued a letter explaining the implications of the law as applied to law enforcement officers. Id. Consequently, Hiley was
dismissed 'for cause' from his position. Id.. Hiley sought injunctive relief enjoining any
member of the National Association of Government Employees from applying the Lautenberg Amendment to its members on the grounds that the Lautenberg Amendment was
unconstitutional. Id. at 1568-69. The court rejected six theories underlying plaintiffs constitutional challenges. Id. at 1578. The district court held that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted, upholding the Lautenberg
Amendment as constitutional. Id.
54 See id. at 1572 (analyzing Lautenberg Amendment under Commerce Clause).
55 See id. at 1572-73 (discussing constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment under
Equal Protection Clause).
so See id. at 1575 (discussing substantive due process challenges to Lautenberg
Amendment).
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Bill of Attainder Clauses. 58 It also argued that the Amendment
violated the Tenth Amendment in that it usurps powers reserved
to the states. 59 The District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia reasoned that the Lautenberg Amendment was not a
violation of the Commerce Clause as it contained the necessary
jurisdictional element that the firearm was possessed "in or affecting commerce" or was received after having "been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 60 Second, the
court used a rational basis review 61 as the appropriate level of
scrutiny to determine that the state had a legitimate purpose in
classifying domestic violence misdemeanants as "a group of individuals who should be restricted in their access to firearms." 62
This classification was upheld as being "reasonably related to
Congress' purpose of protecting public safety by keeping firearms
out of the hands of potentially dangerous or irresponsible persons." 6 3 In light of this rationale, the court concluded the Lautenberg Amendment was not a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 64 It also survived plaintiffs challenge under the Due
Process Clause because the court held that the Lautenberg
Amendment was "rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose."65 Additionally, the Amendment was held not to be
violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause because it addresses the
possession of a firearm, not the misdemeanor crime of domestic
violence. 66 Furthermore, the court found that the Amendment
57 See id. at 1575-76 (examining Ex Post Facto claims of unconstitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment).
58 See id. at 1576-77 (describing bill of attainder challenges to Lautenberg Amendment).
59 But see id. at 1577-78 (holding that Lautenberg Amendment is valid exercise of
Congress' commerce authority and therefore cannot violate Tenth Amendment).
so See id. at 1572 (quoting jurisdictional element of § 922(g)(9)).
61 See id. at 1573 (using rational basis of review as appropriate level of scrutiny for
equal protection challenges because claims do not involve suspect class or fundamental
right); see also Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 657 (1981) (holding unless fundamental right is implicated, statute will be upheld if
it is rationally related to achievement of legitimate governmental interest such that there
is reasonably conceivable facts that could provide rational basis for classification).
62 See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1573 (determining state had
rational basis for classification of domestic violence misdemeanants).
63 See id. (upholding classification as reasonably related to legislature's intent).
64 See id. at 1573 (classifying domestic violence misdemeanants as group of individuals is reasonably related to Congress' legitimate interest behind enactment of Lautenberg
Amendment).
65 See id. at 1576 (obviating need to discuss plaintiffs due process allegations of Lautenberg Amendment in light of Equal Protection analysis).
6s See id. at 1576 (stating Lautenberg Amendment withstands constitutional chal-
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did not fall within the historical meaning of legislative punishment and that due to its "well-defined goals" it reasonably furthered nonpunitive legislative purposes. 6 7 Finally, the court held
that because the Amendment "[wa]s a valid exercise of Congress'
commerce authority, it ... [could not] violate the Tenth Amendment."6 8 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently af69
firmed this decision.
However, the plaintiffs in The Fraternal Order of Police v.
Unites States, were successful in challenging the Lautenberg
Amendment in the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the lower court's holding that the Lautenberg Amendment
was constitutional. 7 0 This suit was brought on behalf of two police officers with prior domestic violence misdemeanor convictions. 7 1 The Fraternal Order of Police brought this claim for fear
that the Lautenberg Amendment threatened to deprive police officers not only of their constitutional right to possess firearms,
but of their livelihood as well. 72 The District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the Amendment as constitutional under
the Commerce, Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as well
as the Tenth Amendment. 7 3 The court reasoned that the statute
contained the requisite jurisdictional element to withstand constitutional challenge under the Commerce Clause. 74 Under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the court held that
the classification of domestic violence misdemeanants was rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental
interest of "keeping firearms out of the hands of categories of potentially irresponsible persons." 75 The Lautenberg Amendment
lenge under Ex Post Facto Clause).
67 See id. at 1576-77 (indicating Lautenberg Amendment is not bill of attainder).
6s See id. at 1577 (stressing Lautenberg Amendment is not violation of Tenth
Amendment).
69 See National Ass'n of Govt Employees v. Barrett, 155 F.3d 1276, 1276 (11th Cir.
1998) (affirming district court's opinion).
70 See The Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997)
(failing in attempt to challenge constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment), rev'd, 152
F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
71 See 981 F. Supp. at 3.
72 See id. at 3.
73 See id. at 6 (upholding Lautenberg Amendment as constitutional).
74 See id. at 4 (stating Lautenberg Amendment is constitutional under Commerce
Clause due to fact it contains language that firearm be possessed "in or affecting commerce" or transported "in interstate or foreign commerce").
75 See id. at 5 (indicating Lautenberg Amendment's purpose provides rational basis
for classification of domestic violence misdemeanants (quoting Barrett v. United States,
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also withstood constitutional challenge under the Tenth Amendment because it "places no requirements on States or state officials." 76
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the district court's
ruling, holding that because the Lautenberg Amendment does
not address individuals convicted of domestic violence felonies, it
imposes a harsher punishment on those convicted of the lesser
crime of a domestic violence misdemeanor and was thus violative
of the Equal Protection Clause. 77 The court of appeals further
held that Section 925, exempting law enforcement officials and
military personnel from the Gun Control Act, is unconstitutional
as it withholds the public interest exception from those convicted
of domestic violence misdemeanors. 78 Although there have only
been a few cases 79 to date challenging the Lautenberg Amendment, this law has been highly controversial in its application. It
is expected that as other law enforcement officials are forced to
surrender their firearms, more cases will soon follow.
A. An Analysis of the LautenbergAmendment under the Equal
Protection Clause8 O
The Lautenberg Amendment has been criticized as violative of

423 U.S. 212, 220-21 (1976))).
76 See id. at 6 (explaining § 922(g)(9) places no requirements on States).
77 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(reversing district court's decision upholding constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment).
78 See Fraternal Order of Police, 152 F.3d at 1004 (holding § 925 unconstitutional insofar as it purports to withhold public interest exception from those convicted of domestic
violence misdemeanors).
79 See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 12 F. Supp.2d 811, 829 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (upholding constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment); United States v. Hicks, 992 F.
Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Kan. 1997) (holding Lautenberg Amendment constitutional); United
States v. Meade, 986 F. Supp. 66, 67 (D. Mass. 1997) (challenging constitutionality of
§922(g)(9)); see also Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.
1997) (upholding legitimacy of Lautenberg Amendment.), rev'd, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir.
1998); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1578 (N.D.Ga.
1997) (sustaining constitutionality of Lautenberg Amendment), afrd, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th
Cir. 1998).
so See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause is part of the Fourteenth
Amendment which provides that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." Id. See generally
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 676 (The Foundation

Press, Inc. 10th ed. 1980). The Clause has been interpreted to impose a "general restraint
on the use of classifications, whatever the area regulated, whatever the classification criterion used."Id.
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 81 Those
invoking this argument believe that the Amendment is unconstitutional in three ways.8 2 First, they allege it is unconstitutional
because it distinguishes between persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and persons convicted of
other types of misdemeanor crimes of violence. 83 Second, they
submit that it singles out law enforcement officers as a class of
persons. 84 Third, they argue that the Lautenberg Amendment
imposes a harsher penalty on individuals convicted of the lesser
crime of domestic violence (misdemeanors) than it does for individuals convicted of the greater crime of domestic violence (felonies). 85
Congress, through the Lautenberg Amendment, has classified
domestic violence misdemeanants as a group that should be restricted from firearm possession. 86 These domestic violence misdemeanants are not a suspect class being denied a fundamental
right, 87 thus, a rational basis review is the appropriate level of
81 See NationalAss'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1578. In this case the plaintiffs brought their claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. However, this was incorrect because the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to the states and not the federal
government. Id. The Fifth Amendment places the same limits on the exercise of the federal government as the Fourteenth Amendment places on the states. Id. Therefore, the
court treated the claim as if it were properly brought under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
82 See id. (setting forth plaintiffs' three arguments that Lautenberg Amendment is
unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause).
83 See FraternalOrder of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5 (arguing that imposing firearm disability only on those who have committed domestic violence misdemeanors gives irrationally preferential treatment to persons convicted of other misdemeanors); National Ass'n of
Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1572 (asserting unconstitutionality of Lautenberg
Amendment on equal protection grounds).
84 See Gillespie, 13 F. Supp.2d at 824 (contending Lautenberg Amendment has disproportionate impact on law enforcement officials); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F.
Supp. at 1572 (arguing Lautenberg Amendment violates Equal Protection Clause because
it discriminates against domestic violence misdemeanants who are also enforcement officers).
85 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding Lautenberg Amendment unfairly distinguishes between domestic violence misdemeanors and domestic violence felons); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F.Supp.
at 1572 (setting forth argument that Lautenberg Amendment irrationally allows felons,
but not domestic violence misdemeanants to possess firearm).
s See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1999). The Lautenberg Amendment to the 1968
Gun Control Act applies to "any person ... who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence." Id.; 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)-(8). The Gun Control Act
also applies to felons, fugitives from justice, persons unlawfully using or addicted to controlled substances, persons adjudicated as mental defectives, persons who have been
committed to a mental institution, illegal aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from
the armed services, persons who have renounced their citizenship and persons subject to a
court order that restrains them from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate
partner or child of such partner. Id.
87 See FraternalOrder of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5. All courts that have reviewed the
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scrutiny. 8 8 The classification, therefore, need only be "reasonably related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental interest."8 9 Congress' goal in enacting the Lautenberg Amendment, to reduce the risk of fatal violence by removing firearms
from the homes of individuals known to be prone to domestic
violence, is a reasonable justification for the classification of persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence. 9 0
Due to the fact that many intimate abuse cases are pled-down
and prosecuted at the misdemeanor level, such a distinction between all misdemeanants and those misdemeanants who have
committed domestic violence has a rational basis to achieve the
federal government's intended goal. 9 1
The Lautenberg Amendment, however, has been held to be
violative of the Equal Protection Clause because it imposes a
more severe penalty on individuals convicted of the lesser crime
of domestic violence than it does on those convicted of the greater
crime. 9 2 Therefore, the Lautenberg Amendment may need to be
Lautenberg Amendment to date have applied a 'rational basis' standard of review. Id.;
NationalAss'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1573. Plaintiffs in both cases sought to
have the Lautenberg Amendment receive a strict scrutiny analysis since both maintained
that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right. Id.; see also Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1980). There is, however, no fundamental right to receive or possess
firearms. Id. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). No fundamental right exists to bear arms unless it is reasonably related to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia. Id.; United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974). The
Court held that § 922(g) does not violate the Second Amendment. Id.
8s See Massachusetts Bd.of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (explaining that rational basis is appropriate level of scrutiny under Equal Protection analysis if
no suspect class is implicated); Association of Civilian Technicians v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 756 F.2d 172, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (utilizing rational basis of review where no
suspect class); see also Price v. Tanner, 855 F.2d 820, 823 n.7 (11th Cir. 1988) (illustrating
use of rational basis review in cases where no suspect class is at issue). See generally Rachel A. Brown, Heller v. Doe: The Supreme Court Diminishes the Rights of Individuals
with Mental Retardation, 26 LOY. U. CHi. L.J. 99, 123-24 (1994) (discussing constitutional
standards of review).
s See Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973) (stating test courts
use to decide if rational basis standard of review was met).
so See FraternalOrder of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 5 (stressing classification was reasonably justified by Congressional intent of reducing fatal violence); National Ass'n of
Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1573 (classifying domestic violence misdemeanants as
reasonably related to legislative intent).
91 See Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearings on S. 2646
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Cong. 10379, 3-5 (1996) (statement of Sen. Diane
Feinstein) (referring to necessity of legislation at misdemeanor level due to fact that many
domestic violence offenders are never convicted of felonies because victims are reluctant
to cooperate for fear of more violence and plea bargains usually result in misdemeanor
conviction for what are felony crimes).
92 See Fraternal Order of Police v. United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(holding Lautenberg Amendment unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause because it unfairly discriminates between domestic violence misdemeanants and felons).
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amended so that it will apply to domestic violence felons as well.
The assertion that the Lautenberg Amendment unfairly targets law enforcement officers also appears to be invalid. 93 As
long as the classification is rationally based, if such classification
has uneven effects upon a particular group, it has been held to be
of no constitutional concern. 94 Therefore, it would seem that the
fact that some law enforcement officers may lose their current
employment status due to the effects of this law does not render
the law unconstitutional.
A similar analysis was used in conjunction with the classification of individuals convicted of an analogous societal evil, namely
community notification and registration laws ("Megan's Laws").
Megan's Laws involve the classification of 'compulsive and repetitive' sex offenders. These laws have been held valid under
the Equal Protection Clause. 95 The goal of protecting vulnerable
individuals from sexual offenses is a legitimate state interest
that is rationally related to the required registration of convicted
sex offenders whose offenses are found to be 'repetitive and compulsive.' 96 Analogously, this Note contends that the Lautenberg
Amendment's classification of domestic violence misdemeanants,
93 See FraternalOrder of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4-5 (holding that § 922(g)(9) does not
discriminate against law enforcement officials); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F.
Supp. at 1573 (upholding Lautenberg Amendment against Due Process claim).
94 See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271 (1979). An exception to
this rule is available if it can be shown that the classification was due to a discriminatory
purpose. Id. at 272.; 142 CONG. REC. S 11227 (1996). Legislative intent clearly demonstrates that there is no such discriminatory purpose with regard to police officers and the
military. Id. Senator Lautenberg stated that the purpose of the Lautenberg Amendment
was to protect victims of domestic violence from further harm. Id. Therefore, the aim of
this legislation is not to single out police officers and others who have committed domestic
violence misdemeanors and whose occupation requires the possession of a firearm. Id.; see
also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 385 (1979). In Johnson, the Court held that equal
protection for individuals does not deny Congress the right to treat persons of different
classes in different ways. Id. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1999). In this particular instance Congress has classified domestic violence misdemeanants as a group of
individuals that should have restricted access to firearms. Id.
95 See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F. 3d 1077, 1085-86 (3d Cir. 1997) (upholding Megan's
Law in New Jersey under Equal Protection analysis as long as classifications are specific);
Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 367 (N.J. 1995) (upholding both registration and notification
provisions of Megan's Law under Equal Protection Clause); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217,
1217 (Ariz. 1992) (upholding Arizona's version of registration for sex offenders under
Equal Protection Clause).
96 See Doe v. Weld, 954 F. Supp. 425, 436 (D. Mass. 1996) (holding rational basis existed for treating sex offenders different than individuals convicted of other offenses);
State v. Wingler, 135 A.2d 468, 475-77 (N.J. 1957) (holding that classification of 'repetitive and compulsive' sex offenders "has a rational basis"). See generally Daniel L. Feldman, The "ScarletLetter Laws" of the 1990s: A Response to Critics, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1081,
1086 (1997) (describing Megan's Laws and their effects).
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as opposed to other types of misdemeanants, felons or other
members of the population, for the purpose of protecting victims
of intimate abuse is similarly constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
B. Analysis of the LautenbergAmendment under The Commerce
7
Clause9
The enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment has also been
criticized as exceeding Congress' authority under the Commerce
Clause. 9 8 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power
to regulate any activity, even intrastate production, if the activity
has an appreciable effect, either direct or indirect, on interstate
commerce. 9 9 The Lautenberg Amendment provides, "it shall be
unlawful ...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm ... which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 10 0
There are limits to Congress' broad authority under the Commerce Clause as was evidenced in United States v. Lopez. 1 0 1 In
Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
was unconstitutional as it violated the Commerce Clause. 1 02 The
97 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. This Clause states that "Congress shall have Power...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States..."Id.
98 See FraternalOrder of Police, 981 F. Supp. at 4 (claiming Lautenberg Amendment
violates Commerce Clause because it exceeds Congress' authority); National Ass'n of Gov't
Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1572 (asserting claim of unconstitutionality under Commerce
Clause because this power should be left to states).
99 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937). The Court held
that when the National Labor Relations Board ordered Jones & Laughlin to cease interfering with its employees' rights of self-organization and collective bargaining, this was an
exercise of the congressional power to regulate interstate commerce and did not exceed
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. Id. It went further to state that Congress has the power to regulate even intrastate acts so long as they bear such a "close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce" that control is appropriate for the protection
of commerce. Id. at 37.; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995) (describing Congress' power under Commerce Clause); Barcleys Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd.of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994) (discussing when Congress can use its power under
Commerce Clause).
jo 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1999).
101514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that possession of guns in school zone did not substantially affect commerce and was thus unconstitutional); see also United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1244 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating how more statutes are now being challenged because of Lopez); United States v. Garcia-Beltram, 890 F. Supp. 67, 70 (D. P.R.
1995) (citing Lopez as break from norm of incredible reach of Congress' power under
Commerce Clause); United States v. Salmiento, 898 F. Supp. 45, 49 (D. P.R. 1995) (noting
that Lopez has changed landscape in which we now view the Commerce Clause).
io2 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The contested legislation in Lopez was the Gun-Free
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statute was held not to include explicit findings by Congress that
the activity being regulated, the possession of guns in schools, affects commerce. 10 3 More significant with respect to an analysis
of the Lautenberg Amendment, is the fact that the statute in Lopez does not contain a "jurisdictional nexus." 10 4 An appropriate
jurisdictional nexus requires the government to establish that a
firearm was possessed "in or affecting commerce" or was received
after having "been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce." 10 5
In contrast to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 in Lopez,
the Lautenberg Amendment does contain the requisite jurisdictional element. 10 6 The Lautenberg Amendment provides that it
will be unlawful for domestic violence misdemeanants to ship,
transport or possess a firearm in or affecting interstate commerce. 10 7
This jurisdictional language in the Lautenberg
Amendment is fatal to any constitutional challenge under the
Commerce Clause.1 0 8 The possession, transportation or shipment of a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce substantially
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime "for any individual knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone." Id.
lo3 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (stating guns in school zones did not affect commerce).
io4 See id. at 561 (stating Lopez statute did not contain appropriate jurisdictional
nexus). See, e.g., United States v. Chesney, 86 F. 3d 564, 565 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing statute that prohibits possession of firearm by felon as constitutional under Commerce Clause
as long as government proves it was affecting commerce).
io5 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; see also United States v. Kirk, 105 F. 3d 997, 1002 (5th Cir.
1997) (explaining nexus to commerce must be present); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d
808, 820 (4th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Lopez because this statute required government
to prove nexus of item to interstate commerce). See generally United States v. Bishop, 66
F. 3d 569, 575 (3d Cir. 1995) (outlining what is required by Commerce Clause).
1o6See 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) (Supp. 1999). This section states that "it shall be unlawful
for any person ...to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or
affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
o7 See id. (providing it is unlawful to ship, transport or possess firearm in or affecting
commerce).
1o8See United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (1lth Cir. 1996) (holding that jurisdictional element of § 922(g) defeats constitutional challenge of statute); United States
v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that every circuit faced with constitutionality of § 922(g) has upheld it as containing necessary jurisdictional element that §
922(q) lacked in Lopez, thus sufficiently linking it to interstate commerce); see also United
States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 671 (3rd Cir. 1996) (holding that § 922(g) contains sufficient jurisdictional element for commerce clause analysis); United States v. Sorrentino, 72
F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that statute has legitimate nexus to interstate commerce which is needed to be constitutional under Lopez); United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d
1379, 1383-84 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that § 922(g) is valid exercise of Congress'
Commerce power).
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affects commerce. 10 9 Therefore, the jurisdictional element of the
Lautenberg Amendment insulates it from constitutional challenges under the Commerce Clause. 1 10
C. The LautenbergAmendment Withstands Challenges Under
the Ex Post Facto Clause1 1 1
The Lautenberg Amendment has also been criticized as being
retroactive, and thus a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the Constitution.112 Critics suggest that the Amendment is retroactive since it prohibits an individual convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence crime from possessing a firearm even if
11 3
the date of conviction precedes the effective date of the law.
An ex post facto law is one that has a retroactive punitive effect. 1 14 The Ex Post Facto Clause is violated if: (1) the law retroactively alters the definition of a crime, so that an act that was
not a crime at the time it was committed is later defined as a
crime; (2) the law retroactively aggravates a crime, re-defining it
so as to make it a greater offense than it was when it was committed; (3) the law increases the punishment for an act that was
a crime when it was committed; or (4) the law alters the rules of
evidence, by allowing a conviction based on lesser evidence than
was required at the time the act was committed. 1 15
io9 See Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 13 F. Supp.2d 811, 822 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (finding Lautenberg Amendment's jurisdictional nexus is sufficient to defeat Commerce Clause
challenge).
n1o See id. (determining jurisdictional nexus of Lautenberg Amendment sustains its
constitutionality under Commerce Clause).
i U.S. CONST. art. I, §9, cl.3. This clause states "no Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
law shall be passed." Id.
112 See United States v. Hicks, 992 F. Supp. 1244, 1245 (D. Kan. 1997) (challenging
Lautenberg Amendment under Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. Meade, 986
F.Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass. 1997) (criticizing Lautenberg Amendment as violative of Ex Post
Facto Clause); see also National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564,
1575-76 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (alleging Lautenberg Amendment as unconstitutional under Ex
Post Facto analysis), affd, 155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998).
313 See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1575-76 (discussing why
Lautenberg Amendment as challenged under Ex Post Facto Clause is constitutional).
114 See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-44 (1990) (discussing Ex Post Facto
Clause); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-31 (1981) (describing Ex Post Facto Clause
and its retrospective element); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292-93 (1977) (examining
Ex Post Facto analysis); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (setting forth scope of Ex
Post Facto Clause).
ni5 See Collins, 497 U.S. at 42 (describing four elements of Ex Post Facto Clause);
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987) (analyzing elements of Ex Post Facto Clause);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (noting adherence to ex post facto laws since
first expressed in Calder); Calder, 3 U.S. at 390 (setting forth elements of Ex Post Facto
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1. The Possession of the Firearm is the Crime Punished, Not
the Commission of a Domestic Violence Misdemeanor
At first glance, the Lautenberg Amendment may appear to be
retroactive because it prohibits an individual convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence crime from possessing a firearm
even if the conviction of the domestic violence misdemeanor predates the law. 116 A law that merely draws on antecedent facts
for its function, however, is not retroactive. 117 The fact that an
individual has committed a domestic violence misdemeanor is
merely the condition that triggers the Lautenberg Amendment's
application. 118 The crime for which the individual is being punished is possession of a firearm, not the underlying domestic violence misdemeanor. 119 Therefore, the Lautenberg Amendment is
not retroactive.
This point was illustrated in United States v. Brady,120 which
involved an analogous statute applicable to those convicted of a
felony. 12 1 The Supreme Court held that regardless of the date of
the defendant's felony conviction, the crime of being in possession
of a firearm was not committed until after the statute became effective. 122 In Brady, the statute prohibiting firearm possession
was prompted by the defendant's status as a convicted felon. 123
Clause); see also Gonzalez v. Arizona, 907 P.2d 72, 74 (Ariz. 1995) (recognizing congressional disapproval of more expansive interpretations of ex post facto).
116 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1999).
117 See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994) (stating that "[a]
statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising
from conduct antedating the statute's enactment."); Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 435 (1922)
(explaining that statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon antecedent
facts for its operation); see also Strickland v. Rankin County Correctional Facility, 105
F.3d 972, 973 (5th Cir. 1997) (outlining steps necessary for ex post facto analysis); United
States v. Allen, 886 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that "[s]o long as the actual
crime for which a defendant is being sentenced occurred after the effective date of the new
statute, there is no ex post facto violation.").
n8 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).
119 See id.
120 26 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 1994) (examining constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)), cert.
denied, Brady v. United States, 513 U.S. 894 (1994).
121 See id. (discussing statute applicable to felons that is analogous to Lautenberg
Amendment).
i2 See id. (holding that "Ex Post Facto Clause was not violated by the use of a 1951
felony conviction as a predicate for a violation of § 922(g)" because not punishing predicate offense and thus is not retroactive).
123 See id. at 282; see also James B. Jacobs & Kimberly A. Potter, Keeping Guns Out of
the Wrong' Hands: the Brady Bill and the Limits of Regulation, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 93, 95 (1995) (stating that Brady Bill expanded category of people considered to be unfit to possess guns to include ex-felons).
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The court noted that the defendant in Brady had adequate notice
of the fact that due to his status as a convicted felon, it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. 124 The statute, therefore, was
125
not a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Following this rationale, it appears that those convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors receive adequate notice that they
may no longer possess firearms in light of the Lautenberg
Amendment. Therefore, similar to the statute analyzed in
Brady, this Amendment should not be held violative of the Ex
Post Facto Clause.
a. A Nonpunitive Legislative Goal Validates Seemingly
Retroactive Legislation
Another type of law that has been challenged as violating the
Ex Post Facto Clause is community notification and registration
statutes, otherwise known as Megan's Laws. This case is an example of how seemingly retroactive legislation can be found constitutional due to the statute's furthering of nonpunitive legislative goals. The Second Circuit in Doe v. Pataki,126 examined
whether these laws "increased the punishment for criminal acts,"
thus rendering them unconstitutionally retroactive. 127 The court
concluded that application of these provisions to persons who
committed their offenses prior to the effective date of the community notification and registration laws, did not violate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. 128 The court held that because the law fur124 See Brady, 26 F.3d at 291 (stating statute gave defendant adequate notice that
predicate offense made it illegal to now possess firearm).
i2s See id. at 291 (holding statute did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause); see also
Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 238 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that statute that required all
incarcerated sex offenders to submit blood specimens to Department of State Police prior

to final discharge was not violative of Ex Post Facto Clause because not necessarily puni-

tive). But see United States v. Elrod, 682 F.2d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that enlargement of statute of limitations for perjury enacted before previous statute of limitations ran out on petitioner's offense did not violate ex post facto clause and that
sentencing petitioner under new felony perjury statute did violate ex post facto clause
since misdemeanor perjury statute was in effect at time of commission of perjury).
126 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997).
127 See id. at 1266 (examining whether laws increased punishment thus rendering
them unconstitutionally retroactive).
i2s See id. at 1285 (affirming district court's decision to dismiss plaintiffs' claim that
retroactive application of Act's notification provisions violates Ex Post Facto Clause); see
also E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1096-97 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that in reviewing ex
post facto law court must decide whether it is punitive in nature, and in case of New Jersey's Megan's Law, community notification statute, it was not legislative intent to punish); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that notification
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thers legislative goals that are not punishing in nature (the protection of the public from dangerous persons), the fact that it
draws upon a prior offense of a convicted sex offender as an element of the law, does not render it a violation of the Ex Post
12 9
Facto Clause.
By analogy, the Lautenberg Amendment is not a violation of
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. 1 30 The Amendment, by forcing misdemeanants to forfeit their firearms, does
not increase the criminal penalty for the misdemeanant crime. It
merely draws upon that crime as an element to further nonpunitive legislative goals - the protection of women from domestic
abusers.

2.

13 1

The Lautenberg Amendment is Not a Bill of Attainder

Similar to the Ex Post Facto Clause, and frequently mentioned
in conjunction with it, is the criticism that the Lautenberg
Amendment is a bill of attainder. 13 2 A bill of attainder 13 3 inflicts
punishment by virtue of a legislative act that applies either to
named individuals or to easily identifiable members of a group
without a judicial trial. 1 34 In order to determine whether or not
requirements of Megan's law are not punitive and, therefore, not violation of Ex Post
Facto Clause).
12 See Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing fact that law
draws upon prior offense does not render new law retroactive).
13o See United States v. Cirrincione, 600 F. Supp. 1436, 1443 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating
that mark of ex post facto law is imposition of what can be fairly designated punishment
for past acts); United States v. Hazard, 598 F. Supp. 1442, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding
act compliant with Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not either criminalize conduct that
was innocent when done, make punishment for offense more burdensome or deprive defendant of defense); see also Julia A. Houston, Sex Offender RegistrationActs: An Added
Dimension to the War on Crime, 28 GA. L. REV. 729, 757 (1994) (stating that true test of
whether sex offender statutes are ex post facto is whether they are punitive in nature;
only applicable prong of definition of ex post facto laws, which states violation for law that
changes punishment or inflicts greater punishment). See generally Derek J. T. Adler, Ex
Post Facto Limitations on Changes in Evidentiary Law: Repeal of Accomplice Corroboration Requirements, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1191, 1191 (1987) (proposing that retroactive application of evidentiary change does not violate ex post facto prohibition unless it acts in
such way as to change substantive elements of crime).
1sl See 142 CONG. REC. S 11227 (1996). Senator Lautenberg stated that the purpose of
the Lautenberg Amendment was to protect victims of domestic violence from further
harm. Id.
132 See, e.g., National Ass'n of GoVt Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1576
(N.D. Ga. 1997) (discussing whether Lautenberg Amendment is bill of attainder), affd,
155 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1998).
taa See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §9, cl. 1, 3 and 10. The Constitution under these clauses,
prevents both the federal and state governments from passing any bill of attainder. Id.
,3 See U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946) (explaining bill of attainder as legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial); see also WILLIAM STATSKY,
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a law inflicts such a punishment, a court must ascertain: (1)
whether the statute comports with what the legislature deemed
to be punishment; (2) whether the statute furthers nonpunitive
legislative purposes with respect to the 'type and severity of burdens' it imposes; and (3) whether legislative intent reveals Congress' desire to punish by virtue of the statute. 13 5 Courts have
decided that laws which impose restrictions on a particular group
of people, such as those employed in a regulated industry who
share a general characteristic, are not necessarily bills of attainder. 13 6 The court, however, must consider whether the prophylactic measure was reasonably calculated to achieve a nonpunitive public purpose. 13 7 If the law achieves this nonpunitive
public purpose, then no attainder may be said to have resulted
from the mere fact that a particular group is singled out for the
138
restriction.
In light of this standard, the Lautenberg Amendment does not
WEST'S LEGAL DICTIONARY: A RESOURCE FOR THE WRITER AND THE COMPUTER
RESEARCHER 92 (West 1985) (defining bill of attainder).
135 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C., 981 F. Supp 1004, 1004 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(holding that intent of Supreme Court to apply protections afforded under Bill of Attainder Clause to broader group than just individuals is wholly consistent with purpose of
clause); see also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965) (explaining that Bill of
Attainder Clause is "not to be given a narrow historical reading," it is "to be read in the
light of the evil the framers sought to bar: legislative punishment, of any form or severity,
of specifically designated groups."); Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting that even where fixed identifiable group is singled out and burden traditionally
associated with punishment is imposed, enactment may pass scrutiny under Bill of Attainder analysis if it seeks to achieve legitimate and non-punitive ends and was not
clearly product of punitive intent); Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 805 F.
Supp. 489, 493 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (stating that legislative act does not automatically violate
prohibition against bills of attainder merely because it places some burden upon identified individual or group);.
136 See Dehainaut,32 F. 3d at 1066 (holding that court must look to see if legislative
aim was to punish individual or group); see also DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160
(1960) (upholding New York statute which disqualified convicted felons from serving in
any office in waterfront labor organization); Schellowy v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 805 F. 2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1985) (deporting persons who participated in
Nazi persecution in order to ensure that United States was not harboring Nazi war criminals); Hornell Brewing Co., Inc. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (allowing prohibition of name 'Crazy Horse' on alcoholic beverages).
137 See Selective Service Sys. v. Minn. Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
852 (1984) (setting standard of determining whether particular act inflicts "punishment");
Brown, 381 U.S. at 447-49 (stating that to be bill of attainder, Court must determine
whether challenged law inflicts punishment on specifically designated individuals or
groups without benefit of trial); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 404
(N.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that although LIPA Act and Used and Useful Act apply exclusively to LILCO, neither act inflicts "punishment" within meaning of Bill of Attainder
Clause).
138 See United States v. McClain, 61 F.3d 913, 913 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that because §922(g) does not determine guilt or remove protections of trial, it is not bill of attainder).

728

ST JOHN'SJOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 13:705

appear to be a bill of attainder. 13 9 The Bill of Attainder Clause
precludes penalties that, when imposed on a specific individual
or group, bars participation by those individuals or groups in
specific employment or professions. 140 Specifically, the Lautenberg Amendment has been criticized as preventing law enforcement officers from participating in their livelihoods. 14 1 Although
such a result may occur, the Amendment is constructed to prevent individuals from possessing firearms who have been convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors. 14 2 This legislation is
not aimed at preventing individuals from employment in the law
enforcement arena. 14 3 Furthermore, in evaluating whether or
not the Lautenberg Amendment furthers a nonpunitive legislative purpose, it is important to note that the legislature's intent
in creating this law was to protect individuals by keeping firearms out of the hands of potential abusers, not to deprive law enforcement officers of their livelihood. 144 These officials can remain employed in various capacities despite the relinquishment
of their firearm. 145 Since these goals are so well-defined, it
seems clear that the Lautenberg Amendment does not aim to bar
146
individuals from employment in the law enforcement arena.
139 See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Barrett, 968 F. Supp. 1564, 1573 (N.D.
Ga. 1997), affd, 155 F.3d 1276 (l1th Cir. 1998). The court in Barrett,held that § 922(g)(9)
is not a bill of attainder and that defendants were entitled to a dismissal of plaintiffs'
claims to the extent they alleged that § 922(g)(9) was such a bill. Id.
14o See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965) (holding that law
preventing members of Communist Party from positions in office in labor unions violated
Bill of Attainder Clause).
141 See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 968 F. Supp. at 1576 (holding Lautenberg
Amendment is not bill of attainder simply because its effects might render certain law
enforcement officials unemployable in that field); see also Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States, 981 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing affidavits of two FOP members who
argued that application of Amendment will injure police officers by impeding their ability
to serve as law enforcement officers), rev'd, 152 F.3d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
142 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (Supp. 1999) (disabling individuals convicted of
domestic violence misdemeanors from possessing firearms).
143 See id. (indicating nowhere in Amendment does it attempt to single-out law enforcement officers to deprive them of employment).
144 See Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearings on S 2646
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Cong. 2646, 2 (1996) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg) (stating that purpose of § 922(g)(9) was to protect victims of domestic violence
from further harm).
145 See Louise D. Palmer, Police Seek Exemption from Firearms Law, THE PLAIN
DEALER, March 12, 1998, at 10A (discussing police officers alternate options to losing
jobs); Louise D. Palmer, Police Lobby to Gun Down Firearm Law, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
February 22, 1998, at A10 (indicating some law enforcement officials could do desk duty if
not able to carry firearm).
146 See e.g., DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (rejecting challenge under
Bill of Attainder Clause to statute which had effect of preventing convicted felons from
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In addition, there is no Congressional intent to punish domestic
147
violence misdemeanants.
The argument that the Lautenberg Amendment does not constitute a bill of attainder is further strengthened by drawing an
analogy to Megan's Laws. The Third Circuit in Artway v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey,148 addressed whether the
registration provision of Megan's Law was a bill of attainder. 1 49
In its analysis, the court developed a single test incorporating the
Ex Post Facto, Bill of Attainder and Double Jeopardy Clauses in
an attempt to streamline a body of law that has caused much
disagreement in both federal and state courts. 15 0 The court developed a three-prong analysis to determine what constitutes
non-punishment: (1) actual purpose, 1 5 1 (2) objective purpose, 1 52
and (3) effect.' 5 3 The court, through this test, held that Megan's
Law was not a bill of attainder 154 because there was no evidence

employment on New York and New Jersey waterfronts); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S.
603, 619 (1960) (terminating social security benefits does not constitute "punishment");
Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898) (revoking medical license is not "punishment").
147 See Guns and Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearings on S 2646
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 102nd Cong. 10379, 1-2 (1996) (statement of Mrs. Murray)
(expressing getting guns out of homes would make difference - nearly 65 %of all murder
victims known to be killed by intimates were shot to death, firearms-associated family
and intimate assaults are 12 times more likely fatal than assaults not associated with
firearms and in fatal domestic violence situations, 68 % done with firearms); Guns and
Domestic Violence Change to Ownership Ban: Hearingson S 2646 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, 102nd Cong.10379, 3-5 (1996) (statement of Sen. Diane Feinstein) (referring to
necessity of legislation at misdemeanor level due to fact many domestic violence offenders
are never convicted of felonies, victims are reluctant to cooperate for fear of more violence
and plea bargains result in misdemeanor conviction for what are felony crimes).
148 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).
149 See id. at 1263 (determining registrations provisions of Megan's Law did not constitute bill of attainder).
15oSee id. (indicating court developed single test incorporating Ex Post Facto, Bill of
Attainder and Double Jeopardy Clauses to facilitate ease in analysis of constitutionality
under these provisions).
151 See id. (setting forth first prong of Artway test).
152 See id. (examining second prong of Artway test).
153 See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1263. The first prong of the test looks to whether legislative
intent was to punish. Id. The second, "objective" prong has three sub-parts: (a) can the
law be explained solely as a remedial purpose, (b) does historical analysis show that the
law has been traditionally regarded as punishment, and (c) did the legislature intend the
law to serve some "mixture of deterrent and salutary purposes." Id. The third part of this
prong may be determined by considering two questions: (1) whether its deterrent purpose
is necessary to achieve its salutary objective, and (2) whether the measure operates in its
historically usual purpose. Id. Finally, the third, "effects" prong of the test in Artway,
looks to whether the repercussions of the law, regardless of their justification, constitute
punishment. Id.
i4 See id. at 1267 (holding registration provision in Artway is not bill of attainder).
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that legislative intent was of a punitive purpose, 15 5 the registration provisions did not constitute "punishment",156 and the "effects" of the registration provision had little impact since most of
the information was already available in the public record.157
Similarly, Congress evidenced no punitive intent when enacting the Lautenberg Amendment. 15 8 The legislature's "objective"
purpose was to protect victims of intimate abuse from the escalation of harm, not to "punish" domestic violence misdemeanants. 1 59 The legislature's means also seem to outweigh its "effects." 16 0 Therefore, the fact that the Lautenberg Amendment
affects a few law enforcement officials who are forced to surrender their weapons, sometimes rendering them unemployed, is
substantially outweighed by the salutary objective of protecting
women and children from further, potentially fatal, intimate
abuse.
CONCLUSION

The Lautenberg Amendment is extremely necessary legislation
that may need to be amended to apply to domestic violence felons
in order to withstand further constitutional challenge. To allow
an exemption for law enforcement officials from the Lautenberg
Amendment, as the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
has ruled, would completely undermine the legislature's intent in
enacting this law. The legislature intended this law to protect
victims of intimate abuse from potentially fatal violence at the
hands of individuals known to be prone to violence. The mere
fact that an individual is a member of the law enforcement community or military should not exempt him/her from this law. By
See id. (evincing no punitive purpose in legislative intent).
See id. (explaining registration provision did not constitute punishment).
157 See id. (demonstrating little impact because information was already matter of
public record).
is See Murray, supra note 147 (expressing getting guns out of homes would make difference - nearly 65 % of all murder victims known to be killed by intimates were shot to
death, firearms-associated family and intimate assaults are 12 times more likely fatal
than assaults not associated with firearms and in fatal domestic violence situations, 68 %
done with firearms); Feinstein, supra note 147 (referring to necessity of legislation at
misdemeanor level due to fact many domestic violence offenders are never convicted of
felonies, victims are reluctant to cooperate for fear of more violence and plea bargains result in misdemeanor conviction for what are felony crimes).
159 See Artway, 81 F.3d at 1267 (stating intent of legislature with respect to Lautenberg Amendment).
16o See id. (citing legislative intent behind enactment of Lautenberg Amendment).
155

i5
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allowing the Lautenberg Amendment to apply to both police officers and military personnel, the courts would be furthering the
goals of the legislature without violating constitutional provisions.
Ashley G. Pressler

